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Cognitive control is a central issue in developmental psychology. Traditional theories of 
psychology solve this problem by positing a top-down central executive, which coordinates 
cognitive resources in pursuit of goals. We propose an alternative explanation: cognitive control 
arises from physical interactions across many different timescales within the system. We 
examined whether measures of individual differences of these multi-scale interactions could 
predict individual differences in executive function development. Preschool-aged participants 
were asked to complete a series of executive function tasks while we tracked the motion of their 
dominant hand. We found that multi-scale interactions differed depending on experimental 
constraints. We also found that individual differences on multi-scale interactions correlated with 
individual differences of behavioral measures. These results suggest that multi-scale measures 
can be used to measure executive function, and that changes in multi-scale effects may be the 
drivers of change in cognition.   
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Individual Differences on Multi-Scale Measures of Executive Function 
Cognitive control is a central phenomenon in psychology. The human cognitive system 
takes information from the environment and utilizes that information to guide interactions with 
its surroundings. This process requires the coordination of a wide range of cognitive resources 
across many different time scales. In spite of the enormity of this process, the cognitive system 
performs this task with relative ease. How does the cognitive system take control of cognitive 
resources in pursuit of action? This question is of vital importance to any theory of cognition. 
 In classical cognitive theory, the cognitive system is made up of a number of modular 
components (Coltheart, 1999; Simon, 1973; Van Orden, Holden & Turvey, 2003). These 
subsystems are each responsible for a different aspect of cognition. The subsystems are 
controlled and coordinated by a master subsystem, executive function. Executive function is 
responsible for the deploying of cognitive resources in response to changes in the environment. 
 As an example of the importance of executive function, imagine walking across a large 
field. While no doubt an easy task, a number of cognitive subsystems are required in order to 
complete it successfully. Decision-making is required to choose to start the walk and to decide 
on a goal. Memory is required to maintain the goal. Spatial awareness is required to monitor 
progress toward that goal, and to discern obstacles in one’s path. Motor control is required to 
keep moving toward the other side of the field. At the end of the walk, one must be able to 
recognize that one’s goal has been reached, and that a new goal is required. As we can see from 
this toy problem, even in the simplest of tasks, a wide variety of cognitive capabilities are 
required. Executive function is the master system that coordinates these capabilities in the pursuit 
of action. 
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Executive Function: Modal Explanations 
The dominant approach to executive function is to define it as a top down, higher-order 
process (Carlson, 2003; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997; Lyon & Krasnegor, 1996). On 
this account, executive function exerts direct control over the system. Executive function takes 
information about the changing circumstances of the cognitive system, and changes the system in 
response to those new circumstances. Zelazo and Carlson (2012) said that executive function 
“…refers to the deliberate, top-down neurocognitive processes involved in the conscious, goal-
directed control of thought, action, and emotion.” The notion of executive function as a top-
down process is common: “According to most theories, executive function entails the 
modulation of lower-level processes by those at a higher level. Depending on our current goal, 
we are able to modulate lower-level perceptual-analysis and speech-output processes in order to 
produce appropriate behavior (Gilbert & Burgess, 2008).” 
While a popular area for study, a unified, formal definition for executive function 
remains in dispute. Zelazo and colleagues (2004) describe executive function as the ability to 
form and use complex rules. The Cognitive Complexity and Control (CCC; Zelazo & Frye, 
1998) theory describes executive function in terms of the complexity of rules that the child is 
able to represent. As the child grows older, the complexity of the rules and their ability to reflect 
on these rules increases, and their ability to complete complex tasks increases along with it. For 
example, when performing a simple, two-dimensional card sort task (e.g. “sort blue cards into 
one pile and sort red cards into a different pile”), very young children might only be able to 
represent one rule (e.g. “If it’s a blue card, it goes into this pile”). As their executive function 
capabilities increase, they gain the ability to represent additional rules (e.g. “If it’s a blue card it 
goes into this pile, and if it’s red it goes into that pile”). The rules that they can use are more 
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complex, but still constrained until their EF develops further, at which point they can form and 
use even more complex rules, etc. On this account, EF is simply the ability to make and use rules 
that guide oneself in interaction with the world. 
Another approach to executive function is to describe it in terms of memory. On this 
account, changes in executive function performance are related to changes in the ability to hold 
information about the world in memory. A foundational theory in this area was proposed by 
Baddeley (Baddeley, 1996; Baddeley, 2012; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Baddeley was interested 
in forming a theory of working memory, but his ideas have been very influential on the study of 
executive function. Baddeley believed that working memory is made up of three main 
components: a visuospatial sketchpad, a phonological loop, and a central executive. The 
sketchpad is responsible for representing visual information about the world. The loop is 
responsible for representing auditory information about the world. Both of these systems are 
slaves to the master system, the central executive. The central executive is responsible for 
coordinating the two subsystems. The central executive is also responsible for other complex 
cognitive processes, such as the planning of action (Hobson and Leeds, 2001). 
Memory accounts of executive function posit that the development of executive function 
is related to the development of memory capacity (Gordon & Olson, 1998; Pascual-Leone, 
1970). In other words, young children fail to complete executive function tasks not because of a 
poorly developed central executive, but because they are unable to store the information required 
to complete the task. To use the example from above, a child who is unable to complete the card 
sort cannot do so because they are unable to hold all of the salient details of the task in the mind 
at the same time. 
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Munakata described executive function as the process of resolving competition between 
two types of representation, active and latent (Munakata, Snyder, & Chatham, 2012; Munkata, 
2001; Morton & Munakata, 2002). Latent representations develop earlier and are linked to 
gradual learning about the world. Active representations develop later and are more directly 
related to setting and maintaining goals; “these actively maintained representations provide top-
down support for goal-relevant thoughts and behaviors (Munakata et al., 2012).” The 
development of executive function is about resolving the conflict between active and latent 
representations. For example, in the simple card sort outlined above, the first sorting rule (e.g. 
“Sort red cards into this pile and blue cards into that pile”) would be a latent representation. 
Asking a child to then sort the cards by a different rule (e.g. “Sort the trucks into that pile and the 
birds into this pile”) would require an active representation to allow the selection and 
maintenance of a new goal. On this account, younger children with less well-developed 
executive function have difficulty switching rules because they are unable to use the weaker 
active representation over the stronger latent representation. As they develop, their executive 
function capabilities increase and they become able to make better use of active representations, 
allowing them to maintain active goals. 
Diamond (2006) describes executive function as necessary when automatic processes are 
no longer sufficiently able to respond to the circumstances of the system. “Executive function… 
is required whenever going ‘on automatic’ would be insufficient and especially when it would 
lead one astray. (Diamond 2006).” Here, executive function is the conscious process of 
overriding experience, and is made up of three main components: inhibitory control (the ability 
to stop oneself from performing a prepotent response), working memory (the ability to hold and 
use information), and cognitive flexibility (the ability to switch between and form new cognitive 
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patterns as needed). On this account, the three main aspects of executive function develop 
separately, and failure to successfully complete an executive function task is due to a deficiency 
in one of these areas. 
This is a sample of the many theories that attempt to explain purposeful, goal-directed 
action. As we can see, a concrete, commonly accepted explanation for executive control remains 
elusive. A commonality of these theories is the treatment of executive function as a homunculus; 
indeed, the name “executive function” invites the notion of some entity that is in charge of the 
processes of the system. Baddeley (1996) explicitly embraced the notion of executive processes 
as a homunculus, believing that it could some provide some explanatory power. In the early days 
of his working memory theory, the central executive was the hardest thing in his model to study. 
The central executive by necessity became the part of the model that contained all of the 
processes that were not specified in the other two parts of the model: 
It is probably true to say that our initial specification of the central executive was so 
vague as to serve as little more than a ragbag into which could be stuffed all the complex 
strategy selection, planning, and retrieval checking that clearly goes on when subjects 
perform even the apparently simple digit span task. (Baddeley, 1996) 
 Baddeley eventually accepted the specification of the central executive as a homunculus 
as a necessary step in the development of his theory. He took a functionalist approach to 
studying the central executive – researchers should focus on studying the tasks that the executive 
is meant to perform in order to understand more about it.  
While this explicit embrace of the central executive as a homunculus is rare, most 
theories of cognition implicitly treat executive function as a homunculus. The above theories 
limit themselves to the treatment of cognitive control as a functional construct. That is, they 
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attempt to explain what types of actions that executive function is responsible for. “Like all 
functions, executive function can be defined in terms of what it accomplishes (Zelazo et al., 
2004).” This approach has allowed us to build a useful inventory of observed behavior over the 
course of development; however, it has also left holes in our explanations for cognitive control 
where a homunculus might dwell. 
Executive function, as popularly conceived, is a problematic construct. Any fully realized 
theory of cognition must explain how the cognitive system is able to perform the tasks described 
above – implementation of behavioral plans, adapting to new circumstances, etc. In the current 
manuscript, we wish to explore the reasons why executive function is unsuitable as the 
explanation for these capabilities, and outline the theoretical steps that are required to excise it. 
In the next section, we will outline several of the theoretical problems carried by the central 
executive, and offer empirical evidence in support of an alternative framework. 
Executive Function: Theoretical problems 
 Infinite regress. By using a central executive to provide intentionality and control to the 
system, we have not really solved the problem of cognitive control. Instead, we have simply 
pushed those problems back by one level of analysis. The question we wish to answer is “how is 
the cognitive system controlled?” The solution, in this case, is to simply posit that there is a 
master subsystem that is in control. While we have solved the problem we have also introduced a 
new one: how is this master subsystem controlled? The answer would be that another, smaller 
subsystem controls this subsystem, i.e. an executive for the executive. And then this smaller 
controller would need its own controller, which would need its own controller, and so on. 
 This is the problem of infinite regress (Eacker, 1972; Nachey, 2011; Neisser, 1967; 
Skinner, 1969; Sweller, 2003). By positing a central executive as the solution to the problem of 
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cognitive control, we are left no closer to a final answer. If the executive requires references to 
another executive, then this requirement must continue infinitely. If the executive does not 
require reference to another executive, than there is no need for an executive in the first place.  
Knowledge of the Executive. A less obvious problem is related to the knowledge that 
the executive must possess about the world. In order to make correct decisions, the executive 
must have more information about the state of the system and the environment than the system 
itself does (Bickhard, 1993). The central executive is responsible for the gathering and 
interpretation of information about the relationship between the contents of the system and the 
environment. Ergo, the central executive must know more about these things than the system 
itself does; otherwise, the central executive would not be necessary. Unfortunately, one problem 
has been exchanged for another. How can the executive possess more information than the 
system itself? 
 Representations. Executive function is symptomatic of a larger theoretical problem: the 
use of representations to describe cognition. The majority of psychological theory treats 
representations as an innate, necessary component of psychology; the mind and brain, while 
related, are treated as separate entities. Somehow, the physical information experienced by the 
body is transformed into representations used by the mind. On this account, representations are 
the building blocks of cognition, and behavior is a result of change in representations. The mind 
never experiences the world directly. Instead, it experiences its own version of the world created 
using information obtained by the body (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981; Neisser, 1967; Shapiro, 
2007).  
 Representations are symbolic and are taken to have individual meaning in the context of 
the mind. They hold content and are manipulated by the mind in pursuit of thought and action. 
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An example of a representation might be something like “DOG.” This representation would hold 
the meaning of every property one might associate with a dog, e.g. has a tail, has fur, etc. Under 
classical theories of psychology, representations like this are the main content of the mind, and 
store information obtained from the outside world. The mind interacts with representations, 
instead of directly interacting with the world. (Shapiro, 2007; Sun, 2000) 
 At the surface level, representational theories are appealing. Cognition is a rich, complex 
process, and mental representations are one attempt to explain cognition. Look more closely, 
however, and we begin to see that the idea of representation is a deeply flawed way to describe 
cognition. 
 There are several theoretical problems with the notion of representations. First, one must 
explain how exactly representations get their content. Representations must mean something to 
be useful.  Representations may get their meaning from other representations, which then get 
their meanings from even more representations; but at the bottom of the list of references, there 
has to be, in some sense, “original meaning” from which the first representations get their 
meaning. How, exactly, is this accomplished? If our primary method of generating new 
representations is by referencing older ones, then where do the original representations come 
from? (Bickhard, 2001; Bickhard & Turveen, 1995). 
 This problem is deeper than it appears at first glance. If we only experience reality by 
interacting with it indirectly through representations, then how do we know that we’re 
experiencing reality correctly at all? If we cannot directly interact with realty, there would be no 
independent way to determine whether or not our representations are correct. Of course, this idea 
also underscores the problem of incoherence outlined above; if the mind has no independent 
access to the world, and needs representations to interact with it, how can we form 
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representations in the first place? The mind would need direct access to the world in order to 
form representations. However, if the mind were in direct contact with the world, then why 
would we need representations in the first place (Bickhard & Turveen, 1995)? 
 These are only some of the reasons that a theory of cognition that relies on representation 
is untenable. The next section discusses this last dilemma, and the consequence of positing 
nonphysical objects as the main component of cognition. 
 Representations and Executive Function. Executive function is a necessary result of 
integrating mental representations into a theory of cognition. Representation requires a central 
executive in a way that makes it difficult to excise. The notion of the mind as a symbol 
manipulation machine necessarily invites the notion of a manipulator. In other words, if we 
believe that the contents of the mind are made up of symbols, than we must have some way to 
manipulate those symbols in pursuit of thought and action. We must have a master symbol 
manipulator, a homunculus of the mind (Bickhard & Turveen, 1995), 
Thus, we cannot have a theory of representation without also having a central executive 
to bring the system to heel. We may label it differently in different theories, but fundamentally, 
the mind cannot be a symbol manipulation machine without some construct that does the 
manipulating. As outlined above, both the notions of representation and a central executive are 
troubling at a theoretical level. If we wish to be rid of these things, we must conceive of an 
alternate way of describing cognition that does not rely on representation. 
Physicalism 
 How can we avoid the theoretical pitfalls of representations? We propose an alternate 
theory: cognitive control is a self-organizing, emergent property of the system. On this account, 
activity across many different timescales of organization interacts; cognitive structure emerges as 
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a product of these interactions. Changes in the nature and degree of these interactions lead to 
changes in cognitive structure, allowing the system to adapt to the ever-changing circumstances 
of the environment.  
 On this alternative account, cognition emerges from the interactions of physical activity 
within the system across many different time scales. The biological processes of the living 
system are what give rise to cognition. These processes allow us to explain how cognitive 
structure adapts to changes in the environment without relying on representations; without 
representations, we no longer need a central executive. The current study expands on previous 
work by identifying evidence for this position in a range of executive function tasks. 
 As the system moves through its ever-changing environment, it is exposed to a variety of 
energy flows. In response to changes in energy in the environment, the gradients of energy and 
matter within the system change. These interactions, across many different time scales, cause the 
self-organization of the system into a new configuration, adapting to the change in circumstances 
of the system. New cognitive structure arises from these interactions. In this way, the biological, 
physical processes of the system are what cause change in cognitive performance. The energy 
flows of the organism and environment fit together; cognition is a natural expression of this 
connection. 
 The move to Physicalism allows us to avoid the problems of representation. The body no 
longer transforms physical stimuli into abstract representations. Without representations, we 
avoid relying on a central executive, eliminating the troublesome theoretical requirements of 
such a construct. Instead, we can rely on the natural interactions that occur between organism 
and its environment to explain changes in cognitive structure.  
Physicalism: Measurement issues 
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 Describing cognition as an interaction-dominant, physical process poses a unique 
challenge. We have many ways to measure cognitive change at the macro, behavioral scale. 
Under the Physicalist framework, change happens at a variety of timescales, some obvious to the 
eye, others less so. How, then, can we measure changes in multi-scale interactions within a 
system?  
 The current manuscript proposes that changes in cognition are the result of changes in 
energy flows that are both exogenous and endogenous to the system. Specialized analytical and 
measurement tools are required to track changes in energy flow within the system during 
cognitive functioning. These tools rely on the notion of diffusion, and are used to determine how 
the rate of diffusion changes within the system in response to changes in energy flow 
experienced by the system. 
 Measurement of multi-scale activity relies on the notion that cognition is a physical 
process. If cognition is a physical process, then measurements of the physical, multi-scale 
activity of the system should provide information about cognitive processes. Physical processes 
require the consumption of energy; in the present case, energy is consumed by the brain and 
body. As energy consumption changes, local gradients of energy and matter change. Changes in 
gradients cause changes in the rate of diffusion (Dixon, Holden, Mirman, & Stephen, 2012). 
Therefore, changes in diffusion rates in a physical system should provide an indirect measure of 
multi-scale activity. 
 We can measure changes in the rate of diffusion during traditional behavioral tasks. 
Sufficiently fine grained, densely sampled measures of behavior can be used to measure micro 
scale changes in behavior. These changes are indexed by the rate of diffusion of the system 
during the task.  
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The study of psychology works from the assumption that behavioral tasks can tell us 
something about cognitive processes. We typically use behavior at a coarse, macro scale to 
measure changes in cognition. This is generally the easiest scale to measure. Changes in macro-
scale behavior are usually visible to the naked eye. 
  The current analyses make use of behavior at the micro scale of behavior, as well as at 
the macro scale. We propose that the structure that we see at the coarser, traditional scale of 
measurement is driven by changes in behavior at the finer scales of measurement; we are 
interested in the relationship between micro and macro scale behavior. Using micro scale 
behavior may seem unusual, but viewed in this framework it makes intuitive sense. Behavioral 
data is still being used to predict behavior; the data are simply being gathered from different 
scales of measurement. 
In order to measure how changes in multi-scale activity reflect changes in behavior, we 
have adapted a set of advanced statistical analysis techniques. The first, multifractal detrended 
fluctuation analysis (MFDFA; Kantelhardt, Zschiegner, Koscielny-Bunde, Havlin, Bunde, & 
Stanley, 2002), takes as input our motion time series and produces as output a set of values, 
called Hurst exponents, which estimate the rate of change of diffusion from the captured motion 
data across many different scales. These Hurst exponents can be used to estimate changes in 
system activity at many different temporal scales. The vector of Hurst exponents collected over 
the course of each task is then submitted to convergent cross mapping (CCM). CCM is a method 
grounded in state-space reconstruction, which can be used to examine the ways in which activity 
across the multiple time scales of a complex system affect one another. CCM allows us to 
estimate the causal effect of each scale on the others (Further details on CCM and MFDFA can 
be found in the method section of this manuscript).  
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Figure 1 shows a simplified schematic example of what these techniques can show us 
about a complex system. Each of the straight lines represents system activity at a particular 
timescale, ranging from very fine and short at the bottom to very coarse and long at the top. 
MFDFA provides us with numerical estimates that tell us about the degree of activity at each of 
these scales. The diagonal lines represent the interactions of activity among these scales. Activity 
at each scale affects, and is in turn affected by, activity at each of the other scales (at least 
potentially). Changes in the interactions among scales lead to changes in the organization of the 
system, allowing the system to adapt to changes in circumstances. CCM allows us to estimate 
how changes in activity at each scale will causally affect the other scales. These analytic 
techniques complement one another, allowing us to measure the multi-scale interactions of a 
complex system.  
Current Study 
Individual differences and executive function. Executive function is a widely studied 
construct. One of the reasons for its popularity is that individual differences in executive function 
have been found to predict performance in a wide variety of cognitive domains. For example, 
executive function has been linked to theory of mind development (Carlson, Mandell, & 
Williams, 2004). One aspect of theory of mind is the ability of an individual to understand that 
other individuals have different mental content from themselves, and to act accordingly. 
Interestingly, the time period of development of theory of mind coincides with the development 
of executive function. Both undergo considerable development between the ages of three and 
five (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Zelazo, 2006). It has been suggested that 
the reason that these two constructs develop during a similar age range is because they are 
related to one another (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Perner & Lang, 1999). Theory-of-mind tasks 
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often involve showing a child some stimulus in secret; they are then asked to predict how 
someone without their specialized knowledge would react to the same stimulus. For example, in 
a classic theory of mind task a child is shown a box labeled “candy;” when the child opens the 
box, he or she finds that it actually has crayons in it. An experimenter then closes the box, and 
asks what the child thinks a stranger would think is in the box. A child with a less well-
developed theory of mind will respond “crayons,” because they are unable to understand that a 
stranger has different mental content from him or herself, and instead predict that the stranger 
will respond in the same way that the child does (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). As the 
child’s theory of mind develops, they come to understand that a stranger would have different 
perceptual knowledge of the box, and thus would believe that there would be candy in the box, 
matching the label.  
One potential reason that the child might fail such a task is due to a lack of inhibitory 
control (Carlson & Moses, 2001), and an inability to hold multiple concepts in the mind (Razza 
& Blair, 2009), which are commonly accepted aspects of executive function. The child, having 
learned what is in the box, perseverates on its contents for multiple reasons. First, they are unable 
to hold the perspective of a stranger in their minds alongside their own perception. Second, they 
are unable to inhibit prepotent knowledge about the contents of the box. Thus, the child fails the 
task because of their less developed executive function; a certain level of executive ability is 
required to succeed at a false belief task (Moses, 2001). Carlson and Moses (2001) asked a large 
group of three and four year old children to complete a battery of inhibitory control and theory of 
mind tasks. They found that success on the inhibitory control tasks and success on the theory of 
mind tasks were positively correlated with one another, suggesting a relationship between the 
two constructs. 
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 Inhibitory control is implicated in a wide variety of other developmental areas, including 
social development. Kochanska and colleagues (1996) suggested that inhibitory control is an 
important factor in socialization; children need to learn to suppress behavioral patterns that 
would be undesirable in whatever social situation that they find themselves. They found that 
measures of inhibitory control predicted the internalization of a “conscience.” Children who 
demonstrated higher levels of inhibitory control were better able to accommodate themselves in 
a variety of social development measures. This suggests that having a better-developed executive 
function (and thus, being better able to inhibit one’s unproductive impulses) is an important 
factor in the development of socialization. 
Blair and Razza (2007) studied the link between executive function and performance in 
school. They suggested that an increase in executive function capability might be related to an 
increase in school performance. Success in school requires one to focus on the teacher (inhibiting 
impulses to do otherwise) and to make and use plans in order to complete tasks that are assigned 
to oneself by a teacher. Both of these abilities are commonly accepted aspects of executive 
function; it makes sense that the development of executive function would be related to 
performance in school. The authors found that measures of executive function were positively 
related to math and letter knowledge in preschool and kindergarten, suggesting that executive 
function is a necessary component of school success. 
Inhibitory control and the ability to maintain cognitive flexibility are used in a wide 
variety of cognitive domains. As these are dominant aspects of executive function, an 
explanation for executive function is of obvious importance to any theory of cognition; it is a far-
reaching capability, and the way that we explain how it works has a number of implications for 
psychology. 
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Background. The current study is an extension of the work of Anastas and Dixon (2013). 
In that study, preschool students were asked to perform a modified version of the Wisconsin 
Card Sort (Grant & Berg, 1948). Participants were asked to sort thirty cards according to a pre-
defined rule, based either on the color of the card, or on the animal pictured on the card. After the 
fifteenth card was sorted, regardless of accuracy, the rule was changed, requiring the participants 
to infer that a rule change had occurred. We examined differences between participants who 
were able to successfully switch rules and those who used the first rule for the entire run. 
Children who have little trouble with card sorting and can switch rules successfully tend to be 
older, and are typically believed to have a well-developed executive function; children who have 
difficulty with the task are generally younger, with a not-yet developed executive function 
(Zelazo, 2006). Participant hand motions were tracked during the task, allowing us to estimate 
changes in multi-scale system activity during card sorting. The time series of hand motions were 
submitted to both MFDFA and a second analytical technique, vector autoregression; like CCM, 
this technique allows us to quantify how the scales of a system affect one another. We found that 
children who completed the task successfully showed a positive effect of the shortest, fastest 
time scale of activity on all other scales, with no effect at the longest, slowest time scale of 
activity. For children who were unsuccessful at the task, the researchers found a positive effect at 
the shortest time scale of activity on other shorter time scales, and a negative effect of the longest 
time scale of activity on all other scales.  
 Recall that executive function is typically described as a higher-order function. It exerts 
control over the rest of the system, coordinating subsystems for the completion of goals. These 
results suggest an alternative account. For participants in both groups, an increase in activity of 
the shortest time scale led to an increase in activity at other time scales. In the unsuccessful 
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children only, however, an increase in activity at the longest time scale led to a decrease in 
activity across all other scales. Logically, higher-order processes should take place over longer 
timescales, because they must collect and evaluate data from sub-processes before delivering 
new instructions. Higher-order processes seemed to inhibit the system, instead of aiding it, by 
tamping down on processes at other scales of activity. This seems to suggest that it might be best 
to think of executive function in terms of general system flexibility, instead of as a higher-order 
process. 
 This study was a first attempt at using changes in energy flows and system activity to 
predict to changes in executive function performance. It established a foundation for the idea that 
executive control is a complex, emergent property of the cognitive system. However, given the 
design of the study, only group-level differences could be addressed. The main goal of the 
current project is to extend this earlier work by measuring individual differences in system 
activity between participants. In the current project, we wished to examine whether multi-scale 
methods are suitable for measuring individual differences among participants. Ultimately, we 
hope these multi-scale techniques may be able to provide a more fine-grained, nuanced 
assessment of executive function than the current suite of macro-scale, behavioral tools currently 
in use. 
 We asked a group of participants between the ages of three and five years to perform a 
series of executive function tasks while wearing a motion-tracking device. We used the motion 
time series to estimate changes in multi-scale effects for each individual participant. Using this 
data, we can determine how changes in multi-scale performance predict behavioral performance 
during each task. 
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A major obstacle in the use of these analyses is the amount of data required. In the past, 
limitations in measurement equipment, combined with the length of time required to gather 
enough data, have limited us to running these analyses on group level data. However, with access 
to a new, faster motion-tracker, we were able to gather enough data to analyze multi-scale 
activity at an individual level. The current project explores the idea that multi-scale techniques 
can be used to examine individual differences between participants. If these techniques track 
individual differences, then they may be even more sensitive to differences between participants 
than current macro-scale measurements 
 We predict that multi-scale measures will predict to behavioral performance on each of 
the tasks. If self-organizing processes are what drive changes in cognitive performance, then 
methods that capture these processes should also be useable to capture change during cognitive 
tasks. We already have evidence, as outlined above, of how behavioral measures can be used to 
track improvements in cognitive performance (e.g., using the number of cards correctly sorted to 
determine the state of development of a child’s executive function). What remains to be fully 
determined is whether or not multi-scale measures can be used in the same way. 
 The current project is designed to explore the potential use of multi-scale measures to 
track changes in cognitive performance. We hypothesize that patterns obtained by using multi-
scale measures will be consistently linked to performance on each of the motion-capture tasks. 
Participants that show higher rates of success, and therefore better-developed executive 
functions, will show different multi-scale effects than participants who show poorer macro-scale 
performance. Multi-scale measures will predict the executive function capabilities of 
participants. We also expect that multi-scale measures will predict between tasks. Multi-scale 
patterns will be consistent with macro-scale performance across tasks. 
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Method 
General 
 The current study consists of five separate tasks. In order to minimize the time a 
participant spent away from their classrooms on any given day, and the tedium of the study, the 
tasks were broken up into two sessions. In the first session, participants were asked to complete 
the Dimensional Change Card Sort and the Tower of Hanoi tasks. In the second session, 
participants were asked to complete the Pointer task and the executive function battery.  
Participants. 33 children participated in the study. Participants ranged between 36 and 
72 months in age (M=52.1 months, SD = 7.75). Participants were recruited at daycares and 
preschools local to the University of Connecticut. Parent or guardian consent and child assent 
were obtained prior to the start of the study. 
 Each participant was asked to complete all five tasks. Some participants, however, opted 
to not finish all of the tasks, and/or only provided useable data for some of the tasks. As a result, 
the number of participants varied slightly across tasks. 
Dimensional Change Card Sort 
 Apparatus. We followed the experimental protocol for the Dimensional Change Card 
Sort established by Zelazo (2006). Participants were required to sort a deck of cards into one of 
two containers. Each card depicted a colorful animal (e.g. a red cow). For each run, a unique 
deck of twelve cards was generated where half of the cards in the deck were of one animal/color 
combination and the other half was of a different combination (e.g. a deck might consist of six 
red cow cards and six blue lion cards). 
Participants were seated at a table facing a projector screen and two small hard foam 
containers within reach. A laptop computer was used to project a pair of target cards onto the 
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screen, positioned above the two containers. The target cards were designed to contrast the deck 
cards. For example, if the deck contained red cows and blue lions, the target cards would be red 
lions and blue cows. Figure 2 depicts the experimental setup. 
 Motion capture of the participant’s hand motions during the task was recorded at 180 Hz 
using a wireless magnetic tracking system (Pohlemus Liberty Latus, Pohlemus Corporation, 
Colchester VT, USA). Participants wore a polyester glove with a strip of Velcro attached to the 
back. The motion tracker was mounted to the back of each participant’s hand using a Velcro strip 
attached to the tracker. 
 Procedure. At the start of the first run, participants were asked if they would like to play 
a silly zookeeper game. They were told that a zookeeper had accidentally let all of his animals 
out of their pens, and that the zookeeper needed the participant’s help to get them all back. 
Participants were asked to sort cards into one of two containers based on one of two rules. 
Participants were told that they were going to play either the color game or the shape game. In 
the color game, participants were required to sort the cards from the deck based on the color of 
the animal depicted on the card. In the above example, red cow cards would be placed into the 
container with the red lion target above it, and blue lion cards would be placed into the container 
marked by the blue cow cards. In the animal game, participants were required to sort the deck 
cards based on the animal depicted on the card. The experimenter indicated where each card 
should be placed as clearly as possible at the start of the run.  
 Participants were required to sort six cards using the initial rule. After the first six cards, 
participants were told that they would be playing a new game, either the color or shape game, 
whichever one had not been used yet in that run. The experimenter indicated where the cards 
should be placed based on the new rule. Participants were then asked to sort six more cards. 
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Participants were never given feedback during the task. After each placement the experimenter 
said, “Okay. Here is another card. Where does it go?” The experimenter responded this way to 
each trial, regardless of accuracy. At the end of each run, an animal noise was played and each 
participant was told that they had done a great job of helping the zookeeper. 
 For the first run, participants were required to demonstrate that they understood the game. 
The experimenter demonstrated the task, placing one card in the correct container. The 
experimenter then gave the participant a sample card and asked the participant to place it in the 
correct container. If the participant placed the sample card correctly, he or she was allowed to 
continue with the task. Otherwise, he or she was dropped from participation in the task. Under 
these rules, one participant was dropped from participation in this task. This demonstration of 
mastery was only required for the first run.  
 Participant hand motions were captured during the task. During the break in the middle of 
each run, the participant was asked to keep their hand on a stationary cloth patch. This created a 
short time of minimal movement that allowed for differentiation between motion captured before 
and after the rule switch. The motion-capture time series for each run was divided into two 
smaller series. Thus, we obtained two time series for each run: one for motion data collected 
prior to the rule switch, and one for motion data collected after the rule switch. The experimenter 
kept a record of how many cards were placed successfully before and after the rule switch. The 
experimenter also took note of the length of each run in seconds. 
Tower of Hanoi 
 Apparatus. The tower of Hanoi (TOH; Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991) set 
consisted of three wooden pegs mounted to a foam board. The pegs were arranged in a triangle 
pattern, where each peg represented one point on the triangle. A picture of a banana was glued 
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underneath one of the pegs. Three discs of different sizes (small, medium, and large) were also 
used in the set. The discs were made of brown cloth and stuffed with cotton. 
 Participants were seated at a table facing a projector screen with the TOH set within 
reach. A laptop was used to project a picture of the target setup for each run. The laptop was also 
used to play monkey sounds for the participant after each run. See Figure 3 for a graphic of the 
experimental setup. 
 Participant hand motions were captured during the task. As in the above task, participants 
wore a cloth glove with a wireless motion tracker attached on the back with Velcro. Participants 
were told that they could only use their gloved hand (dubbed “The magic hand”) to move discs, 
in order to properly capture hand motions during the task. 
 Procedure. Participants were asked to complete a modified version of the TOH, based on 
work by Welsh, Pennington, and Groisser (1991). They were told that they were going to play a 
game about monkeys. At the start, the task utilized two of the three discs of the standard TOH. 
The smallest disc was labeled the baby monkey, and the medium disc was labeled the momma 
monkey. Participants were told that the two monkeys loved to hop from tree to tree, and that both 
monkeys wanted to reach the banana tree, the peg with the banana label glued underneath it. 
They were also told that the monkeys could only move one at a time, and that the monkeys had 
to stay on a tree. Finally, they were told that the baby could sit on the momma, but not the other 
way around, and that small discs could be placed on big discs, but if a bigger disc went on a 
smaller disc, the smaller disc would be squished. For the first run, each participant completed a 
sample configuration to demonstrate that they understood the task. If they failed to show mastery 
of the task, they were dropped from participation in the task. Three participants were dropped 
from participation in this task, because they failed to demonstrate mastery. 
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 The goal of each run was to get all of the discs to the peg labeled with the banana picture, 
arranged from largest on the bottom to smallest on the top. For each run, the initial placement of 
the discs was varied, allowing the experimenter to manipulate the difficulty and number of 
moves required to get all of the discs on the correct peg. For example, an easy run might consist 
of the medium disc starting on the target peg, with the smallest disc on one of the other two pegs; 
this setup would only require one move to finish. 
 Participants each completed the same set of initial configurations, in the same order. 
After seven two-disc configurations had been completed, the largest disc was introduced to the 
task. Participants were told that the daddy monkey wanted to join in the game. Each participant 
was told that while the baby, momma, or both could sit on the daddy, he would squish them if he 
sat on either of the smaller discs. The participants were then given up to eight more runs, this 
time adding the third disc to the initial configuration. The number of runs given was determined 
by the amount of time taken on the task. 
 During the task, a picture of the target configuration, with all of the discs on the banana 
peg, was projected onto a screen in front of the participant. This was used to help the participant 
understand the goal of the task. This picture initially contained two discs, and was switched after 
the third disc was added. At the end of each run, a monkey sound was played and the participants 
were told that they had done an excellent job and that the monkeys were all happy that they had 
reached the banana tree. 
 If at any point during the task a participant made an illegal move (placing a larger disc on 
a smaller disc, moving more than one disc at a time, placing a disc on something other than a 
peg, etc.), the experimenter reminded them of the broken rule and replaced the disc wherever it 
had been before the broken rule. Runs were discontinued if a participant told the experimenter 
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that they could not figure out the problem, or took more than twenty moves without solving the 
run. For each run the experimenter recorded the number of moves and the total time used for 
each run. 
 Participant hand motions were captured during the task. Participants were told that they 
needed to use their magic hand, which had the motion tracker attached to it, to move the discs. 
Participants who tried to use their ungloved hand to manipulate the experimental setup were 
reminded to use the magic hand, and were asked to put the disc moved by the ungloved hand 
back in its spot.    
Pointing task  
 Apparatus. Participants completed a modified version of the Grass and Snow task 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001). Participants were seated at a table facing a projector screen, with the 
screen in reach of the participant’s hands. A laptop was used to project two target pictures for 
each run. The laptop was also used to play a pleasant sound effect after each run. See Figure 4 
for a graphic of the experimental setup.  
 Each run used a unique pair of pictures. The images on the pictures were chosen using a 
database of commonly known lexical items, the MacArthur Communicative Development 
Inventory (Dale & Fenson, 1996). Pictures were made of items that at least 95% of children 
recognize at 36 months of age, in order to ensure that the majority of participants understood the 
pictures. 
Participant hand motions were captured during the task. As in the above task, participants 
wore a cloth glove with a wireless motion tracker attached on the back with Velcro. Participants 
were told that they could only use their magic hand to touch the screen. 
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  25 
 
 
Procedure. Participants were presented with two pictures per run. The experimenter 
asked the participant if he or she could identify the two pictures; if the participant was unable to 
identify one or both of the pictures, the experimenter moved on to a different pair of pictures 
instead. 
 After demonstrating familiarity with the two pictures, participants were told that they 
would be playing a silly game. In the silly game, when the experimenter said the name of one of 
the pictures, the participant was to touch the opposite picture. For example, one of the runs used 
a picture of a dog and a picture of a star. When the experimenter said dog, the participant was 
told to touch the star; when the experimenter said star, the participant was told to touch the dog. 
At the start of the first run, participants were asked to complete two practice trials, in order to 
demonstrate that they understood the task. Two participants were dropped from the pointing task, 
because they were unable to demonstrate mastery of the task. One participant who had 
completed both of the tasks in the first session was not in school during collection of data for the 
second session, and did not complete the pointing task or battery. The rules were re-explained at 
the start of each run, but participants were only required to do practice trials at the start of the 
first run. Participants never received feedback as to whether or not they were touching the correct 
picture. 
 Runs continued for twelve touches. At the end of each run, the experimenter recorded the 
number of correct touches and played a pleasant sound effect for the participant. Participants 
were informed that they had won the game, regardless of accuracy. In cases where the participant 
touched more than one picture after receiving a word, the first picture touched was recorded as 
the response for that trial. 
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 Participant hand motions were captured during the task. Participants were told that they 
needed to use their magic hand, which had the motion tracker attached to it, to touch the pictures. 
Participants who touched a picture with their ungloved hand were told to repeat the gesture with 
their magic hand. 
Executive function battery 
 Procedure. 
 Digit span. The first task of the battery was a simple digit span task (Espy & Bull, 2005). 
Participants were presented with a randomly generated 15-digit number, whose digits ranged 
from one to five. The experimenter read off the digits of the number, adding one digit at a time. 
After the experimenter read the digits, the participant was required to recite them back. For 
example, if the number were 532415, the experimenter would start by saying “Five.” The 
participant would then repeat “Five.” The experimenter would then say “Five three.” The 
participant would need to repeat “Five three.” This continued until the participant failed to 
correctly repeat the digits twice in a row. The experimenter recorded the number of digits 
correctly recalled. 
 Hand game. The second task on the battery was a simple imitation task (Hughes, 1998). 
Participants were asked to mimic the hand gestures of the experimenter. The experimenter 
showed the participant either a pointed index finger or a closed fist. Participants were told to 
respond by making the same hand gesture. The experimenter confirmed that the child understood 
the game by performing two practice trials. All participants were able to complete the practice 
trials. Participants were required to mimic the experimenter’s hand gestures for six trials.  
 After the initial six trials, participants were told that they would be playing a different 
game. In the second part of the task, participants were required to make the opposite gesture of 
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  27 
 
 
the experimenter (i.e., a fist when the experimenter showed a finger, and a finger when the 
experimenter showed a fist). Two practice trials were performed to confirm that the participant 
understood the task. Participants were then required to perform twelve reverse imitation trials. 
Motion capture was not used in either of the two executive function battery tasks. 
Motion Data Analyses 
The time-series data of each of the three motion-capture tasks was submitted to 
Multifractal Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (MFDFA; Kantelhardt et al., 2002). The results 
obtained from MFDFA were then submitted to Convergent Cross Mapping (CCM; Sugihara, et 
al, 2012). MFDFA allows us to quantify system activity during a task across many different time 
scales; CCM allows us to quantify how changes at each of those time scales affects the other 
scales. A brief description of each technique is presented next. 
Multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis. For each run, a time series of the inter-
point distances for each motion series was created and submitted to MFDFA. MFDFA is an 
extension of standard detrended fluctuation analysis (Peng, Havlin & Stanley, 1995), which 
assesses long-range correlations in non-stationary time series x (t) of length N. First, the time 
series is integrated to produce a trajectory y (t): 
Equation 1                                  
where
  
x(i) is the ith interpoint distance and 
  
x(t) is the average interpoint distance. Next, the 
integrated time series is segmented into non-overlapping bins of length n, such that . 
DFA proceeds with a least-squares regression within each bin. The residuals of these regressions 
provide an estimate of root mean square (RMS) error: 
 
  
y(t) = x(i) - x(t),
i=1
N
å
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Equation 2   
,
 
where 
  
yn(t) is the y coordinate of local trend within each bin. 
DFA treats the average RMS error as the fluctuation F(n) for bin size n. The relationship 
between F(n) and n is the fluctuation function increasing as: 
 
Equation 3     
 
When the fluctuation function is plotted on double-logarithmic axes, the relationship between log 
F(n) and log n may be linear. The slope of this linear relationship is an estimate of the Hurst 
exponent. 
 Standard DFA assumes a single power-law relationship across all scales of interest in a 
system. Multifractal Detrended fluctuation analysis (MFDFA) allows for differences in activity 
at different scales of measurement (Kantelhardt et al., 2002). MFDFA accomplishes this by 
nonlinearly transforming the collected residuals in each bin by a factor q: 
 
Equation 4 FQ(s) º {
1
2Ns
[F2(v, s)]q/2
v=1
2Ns
åò }1/Q 
 
We then proceed through the standard DFA procedure using the new residuals. This 
transformation allows emphasis of different scales of activity; higher values of q minimize the 
effect of smaller scales, and emphasize the effect of larger scales. Lower values of q achieve the 
opposite effect. For each gathered time series, we generated a Hurst exponent for q values 
  
F(n) = (1/N) [y(t)- yn (t)]
2å
  
F(n) ~ nH .
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ranging from -4 to positive 8 at intervals of .5. This vector of Hurst exponents provides an 
estimate of system activity at time scales ranging from the very short to the very long. 
We used an epoching approach in order to track changes in the Hurst exponent over time 
(Weber et al, 2005). Epoching is a useful method for examining a non-stationary time series. In 
the epoch approach a sliding window is moved across the time series; each window is an epoch. 
MF-DFA is performed for each epoch. Each window was 800 samples wide, and was shifted by 
600 cycles for each step, leaving an overlap of 200 samples per step. Approaching the data this 
way allows us a better understanding of how the Hurst exponent is changing over time. 
Convergent cross mapping. The set of Hurst exponents of each participant for each task 
was submitted to convergent cross mapping (CCM; Sugihara et al., 2012). CCM is a state-space 
reconstruction technique designed to assess causal relationships among measured variables in a 
complex system. In the next sections, we will describe state-space reconstruction, and explain 
how CCM assesses causal effects. 
State-space. A complex system is one in which each of the components of the system 
both affect, and is affected by, each of the other components of the system. In mathematical 
terms, each variable of the system is both a predictor and outcome variable. These types of 
systems pose a problem for traditional statistical methods. For example, a simple regression 
model consists of one or a set of predictor variables and an outcome variable. One variable (the 
outcome variable) is the result of changes in each of the predictors. In a simple regression 
causality is unidirectional, as the outcome variable cannot then influence the predictors. 
 A complex system cannot by represented by such a model, because each variable is the 
end result of changes in the state and dynamics of each of the other variables. Causality in such a 
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model is bi-directional, in that the outcome of each variable changes the outcome of each of the 
other variables. 
State space is a way of representing the workings of a complex system. A state space is a 
simple representation of a system in higher-dimensional space, where each variable of the system 
makes up one axis of the space. We can then plot the state of the system at any given time t by 
using the current state of each of the variables of the system at time t as Cartesian coordinates in 
space. This allows us to track how the system evolves over time, by tracking how it changes in 
the state space.  
Takens’s theorem. Given that the state of each variable is reliant on the state of each of 
the other variables, it stands to reason that it should be possible to reconstruct the state of the 
system using information gathered from a subset of its variables. Floris Takens (1981) proved 
that because each variable of a complex system depends on the state of the other variables, 
information about the entire the system is embedded within each variable. The time series of data 
from one variable of the system contains information about all of the variables. Therefore, it 
should be possible to use information gathered from one variable of the system to estimate the 
dynamics of the whole. Takens showed that it is possible to reconstruct an approximation of an 
entire dynamic system simply by using the information provided by one part of the system. A 
methodology, called state-space reconstruction, has been developed to put Takens’s insight to 
work on real data (Abarbanel, 1996).  
State-space reconstruction works by using time-lagged versions of the collected series as 
estimates of state-space dimensions that have not been observed. This reconstructed state space 
has the same topology as the underlying state space of the system. State-space reconstruction is 
particularly useful for situations where we only have access to a limited number of dimensions of 
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a system, but wish to study the whole. For example, Jeong and colleagues (1998) used state-
space reconstruction on the EEG time series of patients with schizophrenia, as a way of 
examining the dynamics of the brain. State-space reconstruction allows us to estimate the 
dynamics of the entire system, even if we only have access to a subset of its dimensions. 
CCM. Taken’s theorem allows us to reconstruct the dynamics of a system using one part 
of that system. CCM takes advantage of this idea by using the time series of one part of the 
system to create a reconstruction of another part of the system.  
The unique contribution of CCM is that it can determine whether two variables are 
causally related. Causally downstream variables can be used to reconstruct causally upstream 
variables, but the opposite is not true. Therefore, the degree to which one variable of a system 
can be used to reconstruct another is a measure of the effect that the variable being reconstructed 
has on the variable used for the reconstruction. Because CCM can differentiate between different 
types of causal relationships, it allows us to assess the degree to which different parts of a 
complex system affect one another. In the following sections, we outline the types of causal 
relationships that can exist between parts of the same system, and explain how CCM can help us 
identify the degree of this causation.  
Imagine that we had two time series, series x and series y, and that we believed that they 
represented the dynamics of two parts of the same system. We also have reason to believe that x 
causally affects y. If this were the case, then we would expect that there would be information 
about x embedded in the time series for y. That is, if x affects y, then y should contain 
information that reflects the effect of x. To test for this effect, CCM uses the time series for y to 
create a reconstruction of the time series for x. If y is causally affected by x, and contains 
information about x, then we would expect that the reconstruction of x using the time series for y 
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would be accurate. After creating the reconstruction, CCM tests the accuracy of the 
reconstruction by correlating the reconstructed time series of x with the original series for x. The 
strength of this correlation is a measure of the effect that the series being reconstructed has on 
the series that is being used to make the reconstruction. A strong positive correlation would 
indicate unidirectional causality. X affects y, but y does not affect x. A near-zero correlation 
would indicate that y does not contain information about x, and that therefore x does not causally 
effect y. 
We can expand on this analysis further. Imagine that we have reason to believe that the 
relationship between x and y is complex. That is, x affects, and is also affected by y. We could 
test this notion by using CCM twice: first, to reconstruct the time series of x using y, correlating 
the reconstruction of x with the original. Then, we would do the same process on y, using the 
time series of x to reconstruct y, and correlating the reconstruction of y with the original. If x 
affects, and is affected by, y then we would expect that the series of x would contain information 
about y, and would create an accurate reconstruction of y. We would also expect that the series 
of y would contain information about x, and would create an accurate reconstruction of x. The 
correlation between the reconstruction of x and x would be a measure of the effect of x on y. The 
correlation between the reconstruction of y and y would be a measure of the effect of y on x. If 
both correlations were positive, this would be a case of bidirectional causality – x affects, and is 
affected by, y. If one of the correlations were positive, and the other near-zero, then the 
relationship between the two would be unidirectional causality – one part of the system affects, 
but is not affected by, the other part of the system. If both correlations were near zero, this would 
indicate that there is no relationship between the two parts of the system. Given a set of time 
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series about the dimensions of a system, CCM can tell us the causal relationship between them, if 
any. 
One final aspect of CCM is a property called convergence. CCM relies on the fact that 
larger time series, because they have more data points than smaller series, will produce more 
accurate reconstructions. The number of data points being used in any given reconstruction is 
called its library size. Convergence is used as a test for the accuracy of a comparison. CCM 
creates its reconstructions by using subsets of the time series that increase with each 
reconstruction, allowing us to see if the accuracy of the reconstruction increases over time. For 
example, if we had a series with 50 data points, we might create and correlate reconstructions 
that use a library of 10 data points, then 20, then 30, and so on until we are using the entire 
series. If the accuracy of the reconstruction increases with library size, we would say that the 
reconstruction is converging. 
Sugihara and colleagues (2012) provide an illustrative real-life example of this concept. 
They were interested in applying CCM to the population changes of anchovies and sardines. 
These species of fish have populations that are negatively correlated with one another. As one 
species thrives, the other withers. Sugihara and colleagues were interested in whether this was a 
consequence of the two species directly competing with one another, or whether another factor 
was responsible for this correlation. 
Using CCM, they reconstructed the time series of each population using the time series of 
the other population (i.e. they used the time series of sardines to reconstruct the series of 
anchovies, and vice versa). They then correlated the reconstructions with the original series. 
Their results can be found on Figure 5, panel A. They found that the reconstructed series was not 
a good match to the original for both comparisons, and that the reconstruction did not improve 
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  34 
 
 
with sample size. This would suggest that the two series do not contain information about each 
other, and that they are not part of the same system. Though the populations are negatively 
correlated, this correlation is superficial, and the two populations are causally unrelated. 
Sugihara and colleagues then used CCM to examine another hypothesis: that the two 
populations are affected differently by changes in the weather. To test this, they used CCM to 
examine the relationship between temperature and the population of the two species. They first 
used the time series of sardines and temperature to reconstruct one another. They then did the 
same thing with the time series of anchovies and temperature. Their results can be found on 
Figure 5, panels B and C. 
What they found was that the reconstructions of the two fish series using the temperature 
series were highly correlated with the original population series. This suggests that the 
temperature affects the fish populations, and that the time series of temperature contains 
information about the population of the fish. They also found that the reconstructions of the 
temperature time series from the two fish series were not well correlated with the original. This 
suggests that the fish time series does not contain information about the temperature, and 
therefore suggests that the fish population does not affect the temperature. 
We can also see from this example what convergence looks like. The correlation for the 
reconstruction of the fish time series from the temperature series either starts at zero or starts 
slightly higher and immediately drops as library size (L) increases. The reconstruction of the 
temperature series from the sardine series steadily increases as the L increases. The 
reconstruction of the temperature series from the anchovy series increases with L before 
becoming an asymptote at a rho value of roughly .2. These maps both demonstrate convergence. 
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The accuracy of the reconstructions of both series increases with sample size, and will eventually 
level out. 
Given enough information about each of the parts of a complex system, CCM can be 
used to determine the relationship amongst each of the potential pairings of the system: 
bidirectional causality (the two parts affect one another), unidirectional causality (as in the case 
of the temperature on the fish population), and no relationship (as in the two fish populations). 
Further, CCM provides insight beyond what can be obtained with standard correlation. Recall 
that a standard correlation of the two fish species was negative. By using CCM, Sugihara and 
colleagues discovered that this result was causally spurious, and that the two species have no 
effect on one another. 
For the present study, we have extended this idea to the time series of Hurst exponents. 
We posit that the vector of Hurst exponents tells us something about activity at each time scale. 
CCM allows us to determine how the activity at each scale affects activity at all other scales. If 
the Hurst exponents across various scales of q are part of the same system, and if they affect one 
another, then we should be able to use cross mapping to determine the pattern of casual effects. 
In this case, the Hurst series each represent a “component” of the system, similar to the fish and 
temperature series in our toy example. We would expect that each of the components of this 
system affect the others. Therefore, CCM should reveal to us the nature of the relationship 
amongst activity across many timescales of the system, as represented by the vector of Hurst 
exponents.  
Figure 6 shows the mean Hurst exponent over time for each timescale of q for the two 
card sorts. Figure 7 shows the same for the pointing task and the TOH. The Hurst exponents at 
each q level show us how activity in the system is changing at each epoch. CCM helps us 
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determine how changes at each scale affect each of the other scales. This is analogous to the 
schematic presented in Figure 1. Activity changes across many different timescales. Activity at 
each scale also causes change at each other scale. MFDFA allows us to estimate system activity 
at each time scale, as represented in Figures 6 and 7. CCM allows us to estimate how activity at 
each scale affects each of the other scales. 
Figure 8 shows a three-dimensional plot of a typical example of cross mapping with 
Hurst exponents. This plot represents one participant during the pointing task. It shows the 
correlation (Spearman’s rho) when reconstructing the Hurst series at q = 8, using the Hurst series 
at every other scale of q. Because we are reconstructing the series at q = 8 from all of the other 
series, this should be an estimate of the effect that q = 8 has on each of the other scales. We can 
see that the reconstructions from the shorter scales of q have lower rho values; this suggests that 
those reconstructions do not match the original series, and therefore cross-scale effects at the 
scale of q = 8 do not affect the lower scales as strongly. On the other hand, the reconstructions 
beginning at q = 2 show very strong rho values. This suggests that the reconstruction of q = 8 
from each of those scales is more accurate, and therefore that cross-scale effects at q = 8 more 
strongly affects those scales. We can also see the effect of convergence. As the sample size 
increases, the rho value does as well, until it reaches an asymptote for each scale. 
For each of the tasks, we cross-mapped every scale from every other, excluding the 
reconstruction of scales from themselves (e.g. we did not map 8 to 8, 7 to 7, etc.), producing 156 
total rho values for each task. Each rho value represents the effect that one scale has on another. 
We then correlated these rho values with behavioral measures, in order to determine how cross-
scale effects and behavioral measures are related. 
Results 
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Behavioral Results 
 DCCS. For the DCCS, we recorded the total number of cards placed both before and 
after the rules switch. The mean number of cards correctly sorted prior to changing rules was 
5.09, with a standard deviation of 2.1. After the rule switch, participants correctly sorted an 
average of 3.11 cards, with a standard deviation of 2.86. Performance on the DCCS typically 
correlates well with age; to test this, we correlated number of correctly sorted cards with 
participant age, both pre and post rule switch. Pre-switch, age was marginally correlated with the 
number of cards correctly sorted, r(30) = .31, p < .1. Post-rule switch, age was significantly 
correlated with the number of cards correctly sorted, r(30) = .53, p < .01. 
 Pointing task. For the pointing task, we recorded the total number of correct points (i.e. 
total number of times the participant chose the correct picture). The mean number of correct 
points for all participants was 8.48, with a standard deviation of 4.38. Participants completed a 
mean of 7.4 runs each (SD = 1.35). As with the card sort, we correlated age in months with 
number correct; the correlation was not significant (r(28) = .22, n.s.). 
 Tower of Hanoi (TOH). To create a measure of success for the TOH, we first calculated 
the minimum number of moves required for each configuration of discs. We used as our 
behavioral measure the number of extra moves a child made to complete the task, if any. For 
example, if a particular configuration required a minimum of 5 moves to complete, and during 
that run a participant took 8 moves to finish it, he or she would be given a 3 for that run, as he or 
she took 3 extra moves to finish. Illegal moves were not counted toward the total number of 
moves. 
 Participants on average took 1.87 extra moves per run, with a standard deviation of 1.07 
moves. As with the other tasks, we correlated the number of extra moves with the age of the 
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participant. The correlation was not significant (r(28) = .13,  n.s.). Participants completed a mean 
of 11.26 runs each, with a standard deviation of 1.07 runs. 
 Battery. We combined the scores on the digit span task and the hand game by averaging 
together the max digit length and the score of the post-switch hand game, in order to get one 
unified measure for the battery. For the digit span, average digit length was 4.12, with a standard 
deviation of .95. For the hand game, average number of correct gestures was 8.35, with a 
standard deviation of 3.8. Digit span and performance on the hand game were not correlated, 
r(29) = .006, n.s. Combined, participants scored an average of 6.22 on the battery, with a 
standard deviation of 1.95. As with the other tasks, we correlated the battery score with age; the 
correlation was not significant, r(29) = .12,  n.s. 
 Cross-task correlation. In order to determine whether performance on each task was 
related to performance on the other tasks, we correlated our behavioral measures across all of the 
tasks, along with the executive function battery. We found several significant correlations 
between tasks.  Performance on the pointing task was strongly positively correlated with 
performance on the pre-switch sort and the battery. Performance on the post-switch sort was 
positively correlated with age. There were otherwise no significant correlations. See table 1 for 
each of the correlations and significance values. 
MFDFA Results 
 We first ran MFDFA on each of the collected time series for all tasks. We transformed 
each series by a factor of q ranging from -4 to 8 in .5 increments. Figure 9 shows the mean Hurst 
exponent by q value for each of the four tasks (Pre-switch sorting, post-switch sorting, pointing, 
and the Tower of Hanoi). Figure 9 also shows the mean R2 of the linear fit between RMSE and 
bin size for each task. 
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Multi-Scale Results: Mean Rho Values 
 We plotted the mean rho value over library size for each of the possible pairings for each 
task. In the following sections, we summarize the general cross-scale results for each task. 
 Pre-switch sorting. Figure 10 shows the mean rho values for pre-switch sorting for 
negative scales of q. Each panel represents the effect of one scale of q. The x axis shows the 
scale of q that is being affected. The y axis shows the rho value that represents the strength of the 
cross-scale effect. The z-axis shows the library size used for each construction. For pre-switch 
sorting, the cross-scale effects for the shortest scales of q are strongest on other short scales. 
Cross-scale effects at the shortest scales gradually decrease for each longer scale of q, until they 
bottom out entirely at the longest time scales. 
 Figure 11 shows the mean rho values for pre-switch sorting for the positive scales of q. 
As before, each panel represents one scale of q. The x, y, and z axes are all the same as above. 
For pre-switch sorting, cross-scale effects at the longest scales of q are the strongest on other 
long scales. These results are an inversion of the negative scales, in that cross-scale effects at the 
longest scales are strongest on other long scales, and gradually decrease for each shorter scale of 
q, bottoming out entirely at the shortest scales. 
 Post-switch sorting. Figure 12 shows the mean rho values for post-switch sorting for the 
negative scales of q. As before, each panel represents one scale of q. The x, y, and z axes are all 
the same as above. As with pre-switch sorting, the cross-scale effects for the shortest scales of q 
are strongest on the other short scales. Cross-scale effects at the shortest scales are weakest on 
the longer scales. 
 Figure 13 shows the mean rho values for pre-switch sorting for the negative scales of q. 
As before, each panel represents one scale of q. The x, y, and z axes are all the same as above. 
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Cross-scale effects at the longest scales of q are the strongest on other long scales. In particular, 
each of the scales pictured has a strong effect on the very longest scales (q = 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8). 
These results are similar to the cross-scale values for pre-switch sorting. 
 Pointing. Figure 14 shows the mean rho values for pointing for the negative scales of q. 
As before, each panel represents one scale of q. The x, y, and z axes are all the same as above. 
As with the above tasks, cross-scale effects at the shortest time scales during pointing have the 
strongest effect on other short scales. There is almost no effect of the shortest time scales on the 
positive scales of q. 
 Figure 15 shows the mean rho values for pointing for the positive scales of q. As before, 
each panel represents one scale of q. The x, y, and z axes are all the same as above. Results for 
cross-scale effects during pointing are similar to both of the card-sort tasks. The longest time 
scales have the strongest effect on other long scales. Cross-scale effects at the longest time scales 
have very little effect on the shortest time scales. 
 TOH. Figure 16 shows the mean rho values for the TOH for the negative scales of q. As 
before, each panel represents one scale of q. The x, y, and z axes are all the same as above. Mean 
cross-scale effects at the shortest scales were similar to the other tasks. Cross-scale effects at the 
shortest scales were strongest on the other short scales. Cross-scale effects at the shortest scales 
had little effect on the longest scales. 
 Figure 17 shows the mean rho values for the TOG for the positive scales of q. As before, 
each panel represents one scale of q. The x, y, and z axes are all the same as above. Similar to the 
other tasks, cross-scale effects at the longer scales had the strongest effect on the other long 
scales. Cross-scale effects at the longer scales had little effect on the shortest scales. 
Multi-Scale Results: Correlations with Behavioral Data 
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 General. We wish to examine whether there is a relationship between individual 
differences in cross-scale effects and individual differences on behavioral measures of executive 
function. Figure 18 shows a schematic example of this relationship. We know that the two 
participants demonstrate individual differences in performance at the behavioral level. Our 
objective is to determine if there are individual differences in cross-scale effects, and if these 
individual differences are related to differences at the behavioral scale. We can accomplish this 
by correlating the rho values for the cross mapping of each possible pairing of time scales with 
performance on each task for each participant. 
For each of the tasks during which we collected motion data, we first correlated 
individual differences of our behavioral measures with the individual differences of rho values 
from each pairing of cross-scale effects. Recall that the rho values from each pairing are an 
indicator of the effect that each scale has on the others. By correlating the behavioral measures 
with each rho value, we can estimate the degree to which cross-scale effects predict task success. 
As an example, we might wish to examine the relationship between cross-scale effects at our 
longest time scale (q=8) and successful card sorting. We would first take the rho value from each 
potential pairing (the cross-scale effect of q=8 on q=-4, the cross-scale effect of q=8 on q=-3, 
etc.). We would then correlate these rho values with the behavioral measures; in this example, 
we would correlate each rho with the mean correct number of cards. The strength of the 
correlation between the rho for each pairing and the behavioral measure would allow us to 
estimate the relationship between cross-scale effects and task success. For example, imagine that 
the rho value obtained from the cross-scale effect of q=8 on q=-4 (i.e., the effect that q=8 has on 
q=-4) was positively correlated with the number of cards correctly sorted. This would suggest 
cross-scale effects at q=8 on q=4 are related to task performance, because the number of cards 
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correctly sorted increases as cross-scale effects at the longest scale on the shortest scale 
increases. Recall that our first hypothesis was that cross-scale effects would be linked to task 
performance – that is, participants who had difficulty completing a task would have different 
cross-scale effects from participants who successfully completed the task. For each task we 
correlated the rho value for every potential pairing of q with the behavioral measure of success 
for that task. This allows us to examine the way in which cross-scale effects and behavioral 
measures are related, and to test our first hypothesis. 
DCCS. For the DCCS, we split the time series for each run into two series. The first 
series contained motion data collected before the rule switch occurred. The second series 
contained motion data collected after the rule switch occurred. Recall that the DCCS requires a 
brief break where the experimenter must explain the new rule to the participant. During this time, 
each participant was asked to keep his or her hand on a marked spot in front of them. This 
created a lull in the time series that clearly separated the pre and post rule switch motion data. 
Each series was divided based on this signature in the series.  
After the rule switch, participants must inhibit an already-active rule in order to succeed. 
We wished to examine whether or not participants who switched rules successfully showed 
different cross-scale effects than participants who were unable to switch rules. We therefore 
treated the two parts of the sort separately for analysis purposes.  
Pre-switch sorting. For pre-switch sorting, we used as our behavioral measure the mean 
number of cards correctly sorted. We took the mean number of cards sorted across all runs, a 
value which ranges from zero to six for each participant. We then correlated this value with the 
rho value for each potential cross-scale pairing of scales of q. 
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Effect of shortest scales.  We first examined the relationship between individual 
differences on cross-scale effects at the shortest time scales (q = -4,-3,-2, and -1) on each of the 
scales and task performance. We correlated the mean number of correctly sorted cards with the 
rho values obtained for the cross-scale effects of these scales on every scale.  
Figure 19 shows the correlations between cross-scale effects and number of cards 
correctly sorted. Each line represents the effect of one time scale of q. We correlated the rho 
value that represents the effect of one scale on another with the mean number of cards correctly 
sorted. Each point on each line represents the correlation between the rho value for scale of q that 
is affected and the mean number of cards correctly sorted. For example, on the right hand panel, 
the black line represents the effect q = 1. Each point on the line represents the correlation 
between cross-scale effect of q= 1 on the affected scale (given on the horizontal axis) and mean 
number of cards correctly sorted. The first point represents the correlation between the cross-
scale effect of q = 1 on q = -4 and number of cards sorted, the second point represents the 
correlation between the cross-scale effect of q = 1 on q = -3 and cards sorted, etc. We can read 
each plotted point as the relationship between a cross-scale effect and performance on the task. 
The dotted lines represent significance values. Any correlation that falls below the bottom line or 
above the top line is significant at the .05 level. 
For the effect of q = -4, we found very strong, significant negative correlations with 
effects on the shortest time scales, q = -3, -2, and -1. We also found negative correlations for the 
effect on the longest time scales, q = 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.  
For q = -3, we found a similar results. The rho values obtained from the effect of q = -3 
on the shortest time scales (q = -4, -2, and -1) were negatively correlated with the correct number 
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of sorted cards. The values obtained from the effect on the longest scales (4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) were 
also negatively correlated with correct number of cards.  
For the effect of q = -2, rho values obtained from the effect on the other short scales of q 
were negatively correlated with the number of cards correctly sorted. Finally, correlations for q = 
-1 showed similar results as those at q = -2. The effects on the other short time scales were 
negatively correlated with the number of cards correctly sorted, along with the effects on q = 4 
and q = 8.  
Effect of mid-range scales. For the values of q = 0.01, 1, 2, 3, and 4, we found no 
significant correlations. 
Effect of longest scales. Lastly we examined the cross-scale effects at q = 5,6,7, and 8 on 
all scales. We found no significant correlations between number of cards correctly sorted and rho 
values for these time scales.  
Summary. For pre-switch sorting, the strongest correlations involved cross-scale effects 
at the shortest time scales. Cross-scale effects at the shortest time scales on most other scales 
were significantly negatively correlated with number of cards sorted. Cross-scale effects at the 
longer scales of q on the shortest scales were negatively correlated with the number of cards 
sorted. Cross-scale effects at the longer scales of q on other long scales were positively 
correlated with the number of cards sorted. However, these correlations only approached 
significance. 
Post-switch sorting. As in pre-switch sorting, we used as our behavioral measure the 
mean number of correctly sorted cards. We correlated the number of cards correctly sorted with 
the rho values obtained for every possible cross-scale effect. There were no significant 
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relationships between any of the cross-scale effects and the number of cards correctly sorted. 
Figure 20 contains the correlation coefficients for these tests. 
Pointing task. For the pointing task, we used as our behavioral measure the mean 
number of correct points. The number of correct points was averaged over all runs, and ranged 
from zero to twelve. As in the card sort, we then correlated this value for each participant with 
his or her rho value for each possible cross-scale effect. 
 Effect of shortest scales. First, we examined cross-scale effects at the shortest time scales 
on each of the other scales. We correlated the mean number of correct points with the rho values 
for the effect of the shortest time scales on all scales. The correlation coefficients for each 
pairing can be found in Figure 21. As before, each line represents the correlation between cross-
scale effects at one time scale and performance on the task, in this case the mean number of 
correct points. The dotted lines represent significance at the .05 level. 
 For the effect of q = -4, we found that there was a positive correlation between number of 
correct points and rho values for the cross-scale effects on the longest scales of q (q=8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 
and 3). 
 For q=-3, there was a positive correlation between number of correct points and rho value 
for the cross-scale effects on the longest scales q (q=8, 7, 6, 5, 4, and 3).  
 For the other negative scales, both q=-2 and q=-1, there was a positive correlation 
between correct number of points and the rho values obtained for cross-scale effects at these two 
scales on the longer scales of q, from q=3 to q=8.  
 Effect of mid-range scales. Next, we examined the relationship between cross-scale 
effects at the mid-range scales and task success. We correlated the mean number of correct 
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points with rho values obtained for the effect of the mid-range values of q (q=0.01, 1, 2,3, and 4) 
on every scale of q. 
 For q = 0.01 and q = 1, we found no significant correlations between cross-scale effects 
and the mean number of correct points. For the effect of q = 2, we found a positive correlation 
between correct number of points and rho values for the effect on q= -4, -3, -2, and -1.  For the 
effect of q = 3, we found a positive correlation between correct number of points and rho values 
for the cross-scale effects on q = -4, -3, -2, and -1. Finally, for q = 4, we found a positive 
correlation between correct points and the effect on q = -4, -3, and -1.  
Effect of longest scales. Finally, we examined the relationship between cross-scale 
effects at the longest time scales and task success. We correlated the mean number of correct 
points with the rho values obtained for the effect of the longest scales of q (q = 5,6,7,8) on every 
scale of q.  
 For q = 5, we found a positive correlation between correct number of points and rho 
values for cross-scale effects on q = -4, -1, and 8. For q = 6, there was a positive correlation 
between correct number of points and the rho values for the effect on q - -4, 7, and 8. For q = 7, 
there was a positive correlation between correct number of points and rho values for the effect of 
q = -4 and 8. For q = 8, we found no significant correlations for any scale of q. Cross-scale 
effects at q = 8 had no effect on the number of correct points.  
 Summary. For the pointing task, the strongest correlations involved cross-scale effects at 
the shortest time scales. Cross-scale effects at the shortest time scales on the longest scales were 
significantly positively correlated with number of correct points. We also found that cross-scale 
effects at the longest time scales on the shortest scales were to some degree positively correlated 
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with number of correct points. Other cross-scale effects were only modestly correlated with 
number of correct points. 
 Tower of Hanoi (TOH). For the TOH, we used as our behavioral measure the mean 
number of additional moves used to complete the task (e.g. if a configuration of discs requires a 
minimum of 5 moves, and the participant takes 7 to finish it, then they would receive a score of 2 
for that run). We correlated the average number of additional moves for each participant with the 
rho value obtained from each possible time scale pairing, as in the other tasks. We found no 
significant correlations. Figure 22 contains the correlation coefficients for this task.  
Multi-scale results: correlation with battery 
 General. One of the goals of the current project was to examine whether multi-scale 
methods could be used to predict between task performances. Recall that one of the reasons that 
the current tasks were chosen was because behavior on these tasks has been previously shown to 
be moderately correlated. We were interested in whether these patterns would appear in 
participant multi-scale effects. In order to examine whether multi-scale methods could be used to 
make predictions between tasks, we asked participants to complete a very brief executive 
function battery. We correlated the rho values representing cross-scale effects for each of the 
motion-tracked tasks with the results of the executive function battery, in order to determine 
whether cross-scale effects on the motion-tracked tasks were associated with performance on the 
battery. This is simply an extension of what might commonly be done with a series of tasks like 
this; however, instead of solely using behavioral results, we are using cross-scale effects. 
 Battery/Point task. We first correlated the rho values obtained from the pointing task 
with battery score (i.e., the digit span and hand-game score averaged together). Pearson 
correlations revealed no significant associations between any of the rho values and performance 
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on the battery; see Figure 23 for coefficients. As before, each point represents the correlation 
between a cross-scale effect and performance on the task. However, for this and each of the 
remaining figures, the correlations are between cross-scale effects for the task and performance 
on the battery.  The dotted lines represent significance at the .05 level. 
 Battery/Pre-switch sort. 
 Effect of shortest scales. We first examined the cross-scale effects at the shortest time 
scales (q = -4, -3, -2, and -1) on every scale.. For all four of the lowest time scales we found 
similar results. For the effect of the four lowest scales on the four lowest scales, we found 
negative correlations between the rho values obtained and the results of the battery. Additionally, 
for the effects of the four lowest scales on the longest scales (q = 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8), we found 
negative correlations between rho values obtained and the executive function battery. See Figure 
24 for coefficients and significance values.  
 Effect of mid-range scales. Next, we examined the relationship between cross-scale 
effects at the midrange scales (q = 0.01, 1, 2, and 3) and performance on the battery. We found 
no significant correlations between cross-scale effects at these scales and score on the battery.  
 Effect of longest scales. Lastly, we examined the relationship between cross-scale effects 
at the longest time scales (q = 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) and battery performance. For all five scales we 
found the same result. We found negative correlations between battery performance and the rho 
values for cross-scale effects at the five longest scales, on the four shortest scales (q = -4, -3, -2, 
and -1).  
Summary. The correlation between cross-scale effects during pre-switch sorting and 
success on the battery were similar to the correlations between cross-scale effects during pre-
switch sorting and performance on the sort itself. Cross-scale effects at the shortest time scales 
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on other short scales and on the longest scales were significantly negatively correlated with 
performance on the battery. Cross-scale effects at the longest scales on the shortest scales were 
significantly negatively correlated with performance on the battery. Most other cross-scale 
effects were modestly negatively correlated with performance on the battery. 
 Battery/Post-switch sort. 
 Effect of shortest scales. We first examined the relationship between rho values for 
cross-scale effects at the shortest scales of q (q = -4, -3, -2, and -1) and performance on the 
executive function battery. We found no significant correlations at these scales. See Figure 25 for 
coefficients and significance values. 
 Effect of mid-range scales. At q = 0.01 and 1, there were no significant correlations 
between cross-scale effects at those scales and performance on the executive function battery. 
Cross-scale effects at q = 2 on q = 0.01, 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were positively correlated with 
performance on the executive function battery. Cross-scale effects at q = 3, on q = 0.01, 1, 2, 4, 
5, 6, 7, and 8 were positively correlated with performance on the battery. Finally, cross-scale 
effects at q = 4 on scales q = 0.01, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were positively correlated with 
performance on the battery. 
 Effect of longest scales. Lastly, we correlated rho values for cross-scale effects at the 
longest time scales (q = 5, 6, 7, and 8) with performance on the executive function battery. For q 
= 5, we found that the cross-scale effects at q = 0.01, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were positively 
correlated with the executive function battery. Cross-scale effects at q = 7 on q = 0.01, 1, 3, 4, 5, 
6, and 8 were also positively correlated with the battery. Finally, for q = 8, we found positive 
correlations between the cross-scale effects at this scale on q = 0.01, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 and 
performance on the battery. 
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 Summary.  We found the strongest correlations for cross-scale effects at the longest time 
scales on other long time scales. Cross-scale effects at the longest time scales on other long 
scales during post-switch sorting were very strongly positively correlated with performance on 
the battery. Cross-scale effects at the shortest time scales were moderately positively correlated 
with performance on the battery. These correlations approached significance. Other cross-scale 
effects were only mildly correlated with performance on the battery. 
 Battery/TOH. Finally, we correlated the rho values obtained from the Tower of Hanoi 
task with the battery results. We found no significant correlations between performance on the 
battery and cross-scale effects for the TOH. See 26 for correlation coefficients. 
 Battery general summary. For the correlation between cross-scale effects for each task 
and performance on the battery, we were interested in determining whether or not the cross-scale 
results could predict to performance on the battery. For each of the tasks, the correlations 
between cross-scale effects during the task and performance on the task, and the correlations 
between cross-scale effects and performance on the battery, were similar. Particularly for the 
DCCS, we found that it was possible to use cross-scale effects to predict to performance on the 
battery. 
Discussion 
 We predicted that individual differences in cross-scale effects would predict individual 
differences in behavior. In other words, cross-scale effects would vary along with performance in 
each of the executive function tasks. We also predicted that cross-scale effects during each of the 
tasks would be predictive of performance during the executive function battery. First, we found 
evidence of cross-scale effects in each of the time series. CCM analysis revealed interactions 
across multiple time scales during each task, revealing a new level of information to be 
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examined. Second, we found that individual differences in these cross-scale effects were 
predictive of individual differences in behavioral performance at the macro scale. Cross-scale 
effects were related to changes in performance. Finally, we found that individual differences in 
cross-scale effects did a better job than the behavioral measures at predicting individual 
differences on the executive function battery. Cross-scale effects were just as useful as more 
traditional measures at predicting across tasks. 
In the following sections, we discuss these findings as they relate to each task. For each 
task, we will first discuss the cross-scale effects and their relationship to macro-scale 
performance on the task. We will then discuss the relationship between cross-scale effects on 
each task and performance on the executive function battery.  
Pre-Switch Card Sort 
 Behavioral measures. The correlation between cross-scale effects during pre-switch 
sorting and the mean number of cards correctly sorted for each participant was greatest at the 
shortest time scales. We found a negative correlation between cross-scale effects at the shortest 
scales on other short scales and the number of cards correctly sorted.  We also found a negative 
correlation between number of cards successfully sorted and cross-scale effects at the shortest 
scales on the longest scales. We found a negative correlation between cross-scale effects at the 
longest time scales on the shortest time scales and number of cards correctly sorted. Finally, we 
found a positive correlation between cross-scale effects at the longest time scales on the other 
long scales and number of cards correctly sorted. 
 Pre-switch sorting is a relatively simple task, as a participant only has to follow 
instructions, without the need to inhibit a pre-potent response. The negative correlation between 
cross-scale effects and number of correct cards suggests that cross-scale effects are weak during 
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successful pre-switch sorting. Perhaps due to the relative ease of the task, the system does not 
require strong cross-scale effects in order to change to suit the task. 
 Battery measures. We were interested in whether cross-scale effects during each task 
would have a relationship with the executive function battery. We correlated our measures of 
cross-scale effects scales during each task with the executive function battery measure. 
Interestingly, an increase in cross-scale effects during pre-switch sorting was negatively 
correlated with performance on the executive function battery. In particular, there was a negative 
correlation between cross-scale effects at the shortest scales on most other scales and 
performance on the EF battery. There was also a negative correlation between the cross-scale 
effects at the longest scales on most scales and performance on the battery. 
 There appears to be a common profile of cross-scale effects between pre-switch sorting 
and the EF battery. We would expect that if the battery and pre-switch sorting have similar cross-
scale demands, then cross-scale effects would correlate in the same way with both the number of 
cards correctly sorted and performance on the EF battery. We found a similar pattern of 
correlations between cross-scale effects and the battery, and cross-scale effects and pre-switch 
sorting, suggesting that the two tasks share similar cross-scale effects. Further, we found that the 
mean number of cards correctly sorted during pre-switch sorting was positively correlated with 
EF battery scores. This correlation approached significance. These results all suggest that pre-
switch sorting cross-scale effects during pre-switch sorting predict performance on the battery. 
Post-Switch Card Sort 
 Behavioral measures. During post-switch sorting, cross-scale effects at the shortest time 
scales on all other scales were positively correlated with the number of cards correctly sorted. 
Individual differences in the effects of the longest time scales on the shortest time scales was 
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negatively correlated with the correct number of cards. Cross-scale effects of the longest scales 
on the other longest scales were positively correlated with the number of cards correctly sorted. 
 Unlike pre-switch sorting, success at post-rule switch card sorting requires the inhibition 
of an already learned rule. As the task is more difficult, it appears from these results that cross-
scale effects are high during the task. Because the participant had been performing a variation of 
the task at hand, success requires the loosening of constraints on the system, allowing it to 
reorganize into a new order, to suit the new constraints of the task. This would imply that an 
increase in cross-scale effects might occur during successful task completion, which we can see 
to some degree in the results. Interestingly, top-down effects seem to hinder successful card 
sorting. Strong cross-scale effects at the longest time scales on the shortest scales were 
negatively correlated with number of cards correctly sorted. Contrary to the modal way of 
thinking about executive function, it may be the case that top-down influence on the system 
prevents the system from reorganizing to suit the new constraints of the task. 
 Battery measures. We correlated cross-scale effects during post-switch sorting with our 
battery measures. We found that performance on the battery was positively correlated with cross-
scale effects at the longest time scales of the system on the other long scales. We also found that 
performance on the battery was positively correlated with cross-scale effects at the shortest time 
scales on the other short scales. 
 Interestingly, the correlation between cross-scale effects and the number of cards 
correctly sorted, and the correlation between cross-scale effects and battery performance were 
similar to one another. The multi-scale results correlated more strongly with the EF battery than 
the number of correctly sorted cards, suggesting that the multi-scale results tap into a finer-
grained level of information about cognition during the task. These results suggest that the 
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structure required during the two tasks may be similar, and that the coarser behavioral results are 
unable to detect this similarity.  
Pointing Task 
 Behavioral measures. A general increase in cross-scale effects was associated with an 
increase in the number of correct points during this task. We found a positive correlation 
between cross-scale effects at the shortest time scales on the longest time scales and number of 
correct points. We also found a positive correlation between number of correct points and cross-
scale effects at the longest scales on most of the other scales. 
 The constraints of the pointing task are unique. Like post-switch card sorting, success on 
the task requires that the participant inhibit a pre-potent response to the stimuli. Unlike the 
sorting, though, the participant is never trained on a contradictory rule. An increase in cross-scale 
effects is associated with success on the pointing task. This would suggest that success during 
this task is related to cross-scale effects throughout most of the system.  
 Battery measures. As with the correlation with number of correct points, there was a 
general positive correlation between cross-scale effects and success on the EF battery. There was 
a positive correlation between cross-scale effects at the longest time scales on most of the other 
scales and performance on the EF battery. There was also a positive correlation between cross-
scale effects at the shortest scales on the longer scales and performance on the battery. Finally, 
there was a negative correlation between cross-scale effects at the shortest scales on the other 
shorter scales and performance on the EF battery. 
 The correlation between cross-scale effects during the pointing task and scores on the EF 
battery are similar to the correlation between effects and performance during the pointing task. 
These results suggest that the multi-scale profile obtained during the pointing task can be used to 
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make predictions about performance during the EF battery. Scores on the EF battery and scores 
on the pointing task were positively correlated with one another. In this case, it seems that multi-
scale effects and traditional behavioral measures are able to tell us similar kinds of information 
about the executive function development of a participant. 
Tower of Hanoi 
Behavioral measures. For the Tower of Hanoi, we found that, in general, as cross-scale 
effects increased, participants took more turns to successfully complete the each TOH run. We 
found a positive correlation between cross-scale effects at the shortest scales on the other scales 
and the number of extra moves required to finish the TOH.  We found a negative correlation 
between cross-scale effects at the longest scales on the shortest scales and number of extra 
moves required. We also found a positive correlation between cross-scale effects at the longest 
time scales on the other scales and number of extra moves during the TOH. 
A similar effect was found at the shortest time scales. When cross-scale effects at these 
scales on most others increased, the number of moves required also increased. The only 
exception was when cross-scale effects at the lowest scales on the time scales q = 0 and q = 1 
increased. In this case, the number of moves required decreased. 
It would appear for the TOH that an increase in cross-scale effects is detrimental to 
finding the most efficient solution, in terms of moves required, to the TOH. One explanation for 
this finding is that participants with a set plan in mind to solve the problem settle into a new 
organization more quickly, and that therefore cross-scale effects would be demonstrably lower in 
these participants. In this case, we would expect these participants to show lower cross-scale 
effect and to have taken fewer moves to complete the task, an expectation that we can see in the 
results. Participants who have more difficulty, and perhaps have less of a plan for completing the 
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task, take more time to settle into a new cognitive order, and therefore show greater cross-scale 
effects during the task. These participants remain unsettled as they take more moves to complete 
the task.  
Battery measures. Individual level cross-scale effects during the TOH were generally 
either negatively correlated, or non-correlated, with scores on the EF battery. This would suggest 
that participants who demonstrated a high level of cross-scale effects during the TOH task did 
less well on the executive function battery. 
These results confirm the results of the behavioral scale of measurement. The number of 
extra moves taken to complete the TOH was negatively correlated with score on the EF battery. 
This would suggest that the multi-scale profile of the TOH task is similar when correlated both 
with the battery and with the number of extra moves on the TOH. 
General Discussion 
Each of the four tasks showed a unique pattern of cross-scale effects. While the 
differences may be subtle in some cases, the four tasks each provide different constraints, and so 
it is not surprising to see the system changing in different ways as it responds to each of the 
tasks. We were also able to get a sense of how cross-scale differences are related to performance 
on each of the tasks. We have the beginnings of a multi-scale profile for each of these tasks, and 
a larger sample size likely would have further confirmed some of the correlations between 
behavioral and multi-scale measures. 
We have also gained evidence for the notion that cross-scale effects during a task can 
provide a more nuanced view of executive function. At the behavioral level, success on pre-
switch sorting, the pointing task, and the tower of Hanoi were all correlated to some degree with 
success on the EF battery. However, the correlation between the EF battery and the cross-scale 
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  57 
 
 
effects of each of the tasks were quite different from one another. These results suggest that the 
correlations between tasks at the behavioral level of measurement might be masking more 
fundamental differences between tasks that are clearer at a closer level of magnification. 
Interestingly, each of these results contrasts with the modal theories of executive 
function. First, our results suggest that executive function is not a top-down process. If this were 
the case, we would expect that for each of these tasks success would be linked with an increase 
in cross-scale effects at the longest times scales on each of the other scales.  
As a top-down process executive function would need to be located in the longest scales 
of the system.  Under the modal account, executive function is in charge of the system. Because 
of this, it would need to receive input from the other parts of the system before issuing a set of 
orders. Therefore, executive function could only work as fast as the slowest process, and would 
need to operate at a longer time scale. This does not appear to be the case for any of the tasks. 
Instead, cross-scale effects are much more mixed, depending on the task. 
Second, the results suggest that cognitive control arises as a result of interactions across 
time scales instead of relying on one singular scale. If cognitive control were the product of one 
scale of the system exerting control across all others, we would expect that one scale would 
appear dominant when correlating cross-scale effects with our behavioral measures. The reason 
is that the system by definition could not function faster than the executive could give out orders. 
We instead found changes in cross-scale effects across a number of scales depending on the task, 
suggesting that cognitive control during these tasks was a product of interactions among scales, 
rather than the product of one scale exerting control over the rest of the system. 
One drawback of cross mapping is that it cannot be used to track the directionality of 
effects. The rho values produced through cross mapping tell us the effect of one scale on another, 
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but does not tell us the directionality of that effect (i.e., does each scale increase or decrease 
activity on each of the other scales). Cross mapping simply tells us whether or not there is a 
relationship between any pairing of scales. Cross mapping would likely work best in conjunction 
with other techniques that would tell us more about the nature of the relationship between scales. 
 We believe that the current study is a first step into a larger research paradigm. Individual 
differences in cross-scale effects are related to individual differences in task performance. This 
suggests that cross-scale measures can help to supplement the information that we gather at the 
behavioral scale. The current study is meant to lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive 
examination of cognition using cross-scale measures.  
Future Directions 
 We believe that the current work provides support for further explanation of cognition as 
the result of multi-scale interactions. We suggest that the following avenues of research would be 
a fruitful way to examine this theory further. 
 First, there are additional times in the lifespan that seem to be important to the 
development of executive function. For example, Zelazo (2006) has designed a version of the 
dimensional change card sort that is appropriate for older participants, between four and six 
years of age. Participants for this version of the task are expected to break up by age in a similar 
way as participants in the younger age group (e.g. four years olds on the tougher version of the 
task perform like three year olds on the easier version of the task). It is worth exploring whether 
tasks administered to older participants would have similar multi-scale results as those found in 
this study, or if there is something unique to the multi-scale results of this age group. 
 Secondly, it would be worth exploring multi-scale effects in atypically developing 
populations. As an example, the Wisconsin Card Sort (Grant & Berg, 1948) was originally 
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designed to help diagnose executive function deficits in adults. The results of the current study 
suggest that multi-scale effects are sensitive to participant performance. It is possible that these 
effects would also be sensitive to executive function deficits caused by an adverse course of 
development. In this case, multi-scale effects might help us better understand these deficits. 
 Finally, while executive function is quite important to cognition, it is worth exploring 
other areas of cognition for evidence of multi-scale effects. One advantage of Physicalism is that 
it might someday allow us to unify the disparate areas of cognition (e.g. executive function, 
memory, perception/action, etc.) under one explanation. The current work on executive function 
is a foundation for this kind of research. It makes sense to expand this work into other areas of 
cognitive study, in order to determine whether or not multi-scale effects provide the same 
explanatory power for other areas that it has for executive function.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  60 
 
 
References 
 
Anastas, J.R., & Dixon, J.A. (2013). The Multi-scale Dynamics of Executive Function.  
Manuscript submitted for publication 
Abarbanel, H. (1996). Analysis of Observed Chaotic Data. New York: Springer 
Baddeley, A. (1996). Exploring the central executive. Quarterly Journal of Experimental  
 Psychology Section A: Human Experimental Psychology, 49(1), 5-28 
Baddeley, A. (2012). Working memory: Theories, models, and controversies.  
Annual Review Of Psychology, Vol. 63, pp. 631-29 
Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. Psychology of Learning and Motivation  
– Advances in Research and Theory, 8, pp. 47-89 
Bickhard, M. H. (2001). Why children don't have to solve the frame problems: Cognitive  
representations are not encodings. Developmental Review, 21(2), 224-262 
Bickhard, M. H.  (1993).  Representational Content in Humans and  Machines.  Journal  
 of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 5, pp. 285-333 
Bickhard, M. H., Terveen, L. (1995). Foundational Issues in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive  
Science: Impasse and Solution. Elsevier Scientific, Waltham, MA. 
Blair, C., & Razza, R.P. (2007). Relating Effortful Control, Executive Function, and  
False Belief Understanding to Emerging Math and Literacy Ability in Kindergarten. 
Child Development, 78(2), 647-663 
Carlson, S. M. (2005). Developmentally sensitive measures of executive function in preschool  
 children. Developmental Neuropsychology, 28(2), 595-616 
Carlson, S. M. (2003). Executive function in context: Development, measurement, theory, and  
experience. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 68(3), 138-
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  61 
 
 
151+153 
Carlson, S. M., Mandell, D. J., & Williams, L. (2004). Executive Function and Theory of  
Mind: Stability and Prediction From Ages 2 to 3. Developmental Psychology, 40(6), 
1105-1122 
Carlson, S. M., & Moses, L. J. (2001). Individual differences in inhibitory control and  
 children's theory of mind. Child Development, 72(4), 1032-1053 
Coltheart, M. (1999). Modularity and cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3(3), pp.  
115-120 
Diamond, A. (2006). The early development of executive functions. Lifespan Cognition:  
Mechanisms of Change. pp. 70-95.(E. Bialystok & F. Craik [(eds.]). NYC, NY: Oxford 
University Press 
Drayton, S., Turley-Ames, K. J., & Guajardo, N. R. (2011). Counterfactual thinking and false  
belief: The role of executive function. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 108(3), 
532-548 
Eacker, J. N. (1972). On some elementary philosophical problems of psychology.  
American Psychologist, 27(6), 553-565 
Espy, K., & Bull, R. (2005). Inhibitory Processes in Young Children and Individual  
Variation in Short-Term Memory. Developmental Neuropsychology, 28(2), 669-688 
Fodor, J.A, & Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1981). How direct is visual perception?: Some reflections  
on Gibson's “ecological approach”. Cognition, 9(2), pp. 139-196 
Gilbert, S. J., & Burgess, P. W. (2008). Executive function. Current Biology, 18(3), R110-R114 
Grant, D. A.; Berg, E.A. (1948). A behavioral analysis of degree of reinforcement and ease of  
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  62 
 
 
shifting to new responses in a Weigl-type card-sorting problem. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, Vol 38(4), 404-411 
Gordon, A. C. L., & Olson, D. R. (1998). The relation between acquisition of a theory of mind  
and the capacity to hold in mind. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 68(1), 70-83 
Hobson, P., & Leeds, L. (2001). Executive functioning in older people. Reviews in Clinical  
Gerontology, 11(4), 361-372 
Hughes, C. (1998). Finding your marbles: Does preschoolers’ strategic behavior predict  
later understanding of mind? Developmental Psychology, 34, 1326–1339 
Jeong, J., Kim, D-J., Chae, J-H., Kim, S. Y., Ko, H-J., & Paik, I-H. (1998). Nonlinear analysis of  
the EEG of schizophrenics with optimal embedding dimension. Medical Engineering and 
Physics, 20(9), 669-676 
Kantelhardt, J. W., Zschiegner, S. A., Koscielny-Bunde, E., Havlin, S., Bunde, A., & Stanley,  
H.E. (2002). Multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis of nonstationary time series. 
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 316(1-4), 87-114 
Kochanska, G., Murray, K. T., Jacques, T. Y., Koenig, A. L., & Vandegeest, K. A. (1996).  
Inhibitory control in young children and its role in emerging internalization. Child 
Development, 67, 490–507 
Lang, B., & Perner, J. (2002). Understanding of intention and false belief and the development of  
self-control. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 20(1), 67-76 
Lyon, G.R. and Krasnegor, N.A., eds (1996) Attention, Memory, and Executive Function.  
Baltimore, Md.: Paul H. Brookes Publishing 
Perner J., & Lang B. (1999). Development of theory of mind and executive control. Trends  
in Cognitive Sciences, 3, pp. 337–344 
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  63 
 
 
Morton, J.B., & Munakata, Y. (2002). Active versus latent representations: A neural network  
model of perseveration, dissociation, and decalage. Developmental Psychobiology, 40(3), 
255-265 
Munakata, Y. (2001). Graded representations in behavioral dissociations. Trends in Cognitive  
Sciences, 5(7), 309-315 
Nachev, P. (2011). The blind executive. Neuroimage, 57(2), 312-313 
Munakata, Y., Snyder, H. R., & Chatham, C. H. (2012). Developing cognitive control: Three key  
transitions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(2), 71-77 
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall 
Pascual-Leone, J. (1970). A mathematical model for the transition rule in piaget's developmental  
stages. Acta Psychologica, 32(C), 301-345 
Peng, C.K., Havlin, S., Stanley, H.E., & Goldberger, A.L. (1995). Quantification of scaling  
exponents and crossover phenomena in nonstationary heartbeat time series. Chaos, 5(1), 
82-87 
Razza, R. A., & Blair, C. (2009). Associations among false-belief understanding, executive  
function, and social competence: A longitudinal analysis. Journal of Applied 
Developmental Psychology, 30(3), 332-343 
Shapiro, L. (2007). The Embodied Cognition Research Program. Philosophy Compass, 2(2), pp.  
338-346 
Simon, H. A. (1973). The organization of complex systems. In H. H. Pattee (Ed.),  
Hierarchy theory: The challenge of complex systems (pp. 1–27). New York: George 
Braziller, Inc 
Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of reinforcement: A theoretical analysis. New  
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  64 
 
 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 
Sugihara, G., May, R., Ye, H., Hsieh, C., Deyle, E., Fogarty, M., & Munch, S. (2012).  
Detecting causality in complex ecosystems. Science, 338(6106), 496-500 
Sun, R. (2000). Symbol Grounding: A New Look At An Old Idea. Philosophical psychology,  
 13(2), pp. 149-172 
Sweller, J. (2003). Evolution of human cognitive architecture. The Psychology of  
Learning and Motivation, Vol. 43, pp. 215–266 
Van Orden, G. C., Holden, J. G., & Turvey, M. T. (2003). Self-organization of cognitive  
performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132(3), 331-350 
Webber, C.L. Jr., Zbilut, J.P (2005). Recurrence quantification analysis of nonlinear  
 dynamic systems. In M. A. Riley, & G. C. Van Orden (Eds.), Tutorials in  contemporary  
nonlinear methods for the behavioral sciences, (2005), pp. 26-94. Available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/bcs/pac/nmbs/nmbs.jsp 
Welsh, M.C., Pennington, B.F., & Groisser, D.B. (1991). A normative-developmental  
study of executive function: A window on prefrontal function in children. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 7, 131-149 
Wellman, H.M, Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind  
development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), pp. 655-684 
Wiebe, S. A., Espy, K., & Charak, D. (2008). Using confirmatory factor analysis to understand  
executive control in preschool children: I. Latent structure. Developmental Psychology, 
44(2), 575-587 
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function  
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  65 
 
 
of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103-
128 
Zelazo, P. D. (2006). The dimensional change card sort (DCCS): A method of assessing  
executive function in children. Nature Protocols, 1(1), 297-301 
Zelazo, P., & Carlson, S. M. (2012). Hot and cool executive function in childhood and  
adolescence: Development and plasticity. Child Development Perspectives, 6(4), 354-360 
Zelazo, P., Carter, A., Reznick, J., & Frye, D. (1997). Early development of executive  
function: A problem-solving framework. Review Of General Psychology, 1(2), 198-226. 
Zelazo, P. D., Craik, F. I. M., & Booth, L. (2004). Executive function across the life span. Acta 
Psychologica, 115(2-3), 167-183 
Zelazo, P., & Frye, D. (1998). Cognitive complexity and control: II. The development of 
executive function in childhood.Current Directions In Psychological Science, 7(4), 121-
126 
Zelazo, P. D., Müller, U., Frye, D., Marcovitch, S., Argitis, G., Boseovski, J., et al. (2003). 
 The development of executive function in early childhood. Monographs of the Society  
for Research in Child Development, 68(3), i+vii+viii+1-137+152-153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  66 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic example of a complex system. Activity occurs at a number of different 
timescales. MFDFA tracks changes in system activity at each scale. Activity at each scale 
affects, and is affected by, activity at each of the other scales. CCM estimates the effect that 
activity at each timescale has on the other scales. 
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Figure 2. An example of the experimental setup during card sorting. Participants were given 
cards that varied on two dimensions – shape and color. They were asked to place the cards into 
one of two piles based on whichever dimension was being used as a sorting rule. In this example, 
the blue cow goes into the left pile if the rule is shape, and the right pile if the rule is color. 
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Figure 3. A sample experimental setup during the Tower of Hanoi. Participants were required to 
move each of the disks onto the peg labeled with the banana picture. The disks had to be placed 
in order of size, from largest on the bottom to the smallest on top. The starting location of the 
disks was varied for each run. 
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Figure 4. A sample configuration for the pointing task. For each trial the experimenter said the 
name of one of the two pictures. Participants were required to touch the other picture in response. 
In this example, if the experimenter said “dog,” the participant would need to touch the star.  
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Figure 5. Results from Sugihara and colleagues (2012) cross-map analysis of the relationship 
amongst sardine population, anchovy population, and temperature.  
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Figure 6. Change in Hurst exponents over time for pre and post-switch sorting, over 13 time 
scales. Each line represents a vector of Hurst exponents for each integer scale of q, from q = 8 at 
the top to q = -4 on the bottom. Gray bars represent standard errors around each point. 
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Figure 7. Change in Hurst exponents over time for pointing and the TOH, over 13 time scales. 
Each line represents a vector of Hurst exponents for each integer scale of q, from q = 8 at the top 
to q = -4 on the bottom. Gray bars represent standard errors around each point. 
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Figure 8. A sample set of rho values for one participant for the reconstruction of q = 8, using 
every scale of q. A higher rho value for a scale of q indicates that cross-scale effects from q=8 on 
that scale of q are greater. In this case, q = 8 has the greatest effect on the longer scales of q, 
starting at q = 2. The plot also shows some degree of convergence, as the rho value for each 
potential pairing increases as the library size increases. 
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Figure 9. The left panel shows the mean Hurst exponent for all participants and epochs over 
scales of q. Each line represents one task, and the gray bars on each point represent the standard 
error for each point. The right panel shows the mean R2 for the fit between root mean square 
error and bin size for each scale of q. Each line represents one task, and the gray bars represent 
the standard error for each point. 
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Figure 10. Mean rho values over library size during pre-switch sorting, negative scales of q. Each 
panel represents the effect of one scale of q on each of the others.  
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Figure 11. Mean rho values over library size during pre-switch sorting, positive scales of q. Each 
panel represents the effect of one scale of q on each of the others.  
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Figure 12. Mean rho values over library size during post-switch sorting, negative scales of q. 
Each panel represents the effect of one scale of q on each of the others.  
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Figure 13. Mean rho values over library size during post-switch sorting, positive scales of q. 
Each panel represents the effect of one scale of q on each of the others.  
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Figure 14. Mean rho values over library size during the pointing task, negative scales of q. Each 
panel represents the effect of one scale of q on each of the others.  
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Figure 15. Mean rho values over library size during the pointing task, positive scales of q. Each 
panel represents the effect of one scale of q on each of the others. 
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Figure 16. Mean rho values over library size during the TOH, negative scales of q. Each panel 
represents the effect of one scale of q on each of the others. 
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Figure 17. Mean rho values over library size during the TOH, positive scales of q. Each panel 
represents the effect of one scale of q on each of the others. 
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Figure 18. Schematic example of the cross-scale approach. The two participants showed 
individual differences in their performance on the card sort. Our goal is to determine if there are 
individual differences in their cross-scale effects, and if there is a relationship between cross-
scale effects and performance on the sort.  
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Figure 19. Correlation between rho values for each cross map pairing and number of cards 
correctly sorted. Each line represents the effect of one timescale of q. 
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Figure 20. Correlation between the rho values obtained during post-switch sorting and 
performance on the EF battery. Each line represents the effect of one timescale of q. 
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Figure 21. Correlation between rho values for each cross map pairing and number of correct 
points. Each line represents the effect of one timescale of q. 
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Figure 22. Correlation between rho values for each cross map pairing and number of extra moves 
on the TOH. Each line represents the effect of one timescale of q. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual Differences Multi-Scale Measures  88 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Correlation between rho values for each cross map pairing during pointing and 
performance on the EF battery. Each line represents the effect of one timescale of q. 
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Figure 24. Correlation between the rho values obtained during the pre-switch sorting task and 
performance on the EF battery. Each line represents the effect of one timescale of q. 
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Figure 25. Correlation between the rho values obtained during the post-switch sorting task and 
performance on the EF battery. Each line represents the effect of one timescale of q. 
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Figure 26. Correlation between the rho values obtained during the Tower of Hanoi and 
performance on the EF battery. Each line represents the effect of one timescale of q. 
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1       
Correlations of behavioral measures for each possible pairing of task and age     
       
Measure Pre-switch sort 
Post-switch 
sort Point Hanoi Battery Age 
Pre-switch sort  -0.001 .58*** -0.28 0.33 0.32 
Post-switch sort -0.001  0.13 0.08 0.04 .53** 
Point 0.58*** 0.13  -0.22 .47** 0.22 
Hanoi -0.28 0.08 -0.22  -0.31 0.13 
Battery 0.33 0.04 .47** -0.31  0.09 
Age 0.32 .53** 0.22 0.13 0.09   
       
 Note. **p < .01, ***p<.001     
